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Abstract 
 
Corruption is a symptom and outcome of institutional deficiency, with potentially 
adverse effects on economic growth. This paper aims to provide a synthesis of the 
existing evidence on the relationship between corruption and economic growth - 
controlling for effect type, data sources, and country groupings. Using 32 key search 
terms and 43 low-income country names, we searched in 20 electronic databases and 
obtained 1,002 studies. Initial screening on the basis of PIOS (Population-Independent 
Variable-Outcome-Study Design) criteria and critical evaluation on the basis VRA 
(Validity-Reliability-Applicability) criteria led to inclusion of 115 studies for analysis. 
We conduct a meta-analysis of the empirical findings in 72 empirical studies, using 
fixed-effect and random-effect weighted means and testing for significance through 
precision-effect tests (PETs). Our findings indicate that corruption has a negative 
effect on per-capita GDP growth overall. We also report that corruption is relatively 
more detrimental in mixed countries as opposed to low-income countries only and 
that indirect effects of corruption on growth (through the human capital and public 
finance channels) are larger than its direct effects.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Corruption is an ancient problem, with which philosophers, economists, political 
scientists and policy-makers have grappled since 4th century BC (Bardhan, 1997).  
Nonetheless, mid-1990s constituted a ‘structural break’ with respect to the number of 
studies on the causes and consequences of corruption. Since then, not only has the 
volume of literature increased, but also this increase went hand in hand with extensive 
liberalisation reforms and widespread debate on globalisation and its consequences. 
This is not a surprising correlation because corruption tends to thrive when the speed 
of market opening is faster than the speed of institutional development necessary to 
address market failures and/or to reduce transaction costs.  
 
Against this background, scholars, policy-makers and practitioners have been engaged 
in a strenuous effort to understand the causes and consequences of corruption; and to 
devise policy interventions that could reduce its incidence. The combined effort has 
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Weightman, for their comments and recommendations on the protocol and the final report; and Toke 
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produced a large volume of work, with a significant component examining the impact 
of corruption on economic growth (usually, measured as per-capita GDP or GDP 
growth). As such, the evidence base for researchers and policymakers interested in the 
impact of corruption on economic growth is large and expanding. However, 
differences in methodology, data sources, and country groupings – combined with an 
expanding volume of work – create high levels of heterogeneity and make it difficult 
for policy makers and researchers alike to derive synthesized estimates of the effect of 
corruption on economic growth.  
In this systematic review, we aim to contribute to evidence-based policy-making and 
to academic research on the corruption-growth relationship by: (a) providing a meta-
synthesis of the empirical evidence on the corruption-growth relationship; (b) 
identifying potential avenues for further research; and (c) pointing to policy 
implications of the synthesized evidence. In doing this, we will pay special attention 
to the synthesis of the empirical evidence on the corruption-growth relationship in the 
context of low-income countries. However, we will also provide findings on the 
corruption-growth relationship in a wider context, which consists of low-income and 
other countries pooled together.  
The original studies reviewed here draw on different corruption data sources, use 
different estimation methods, cover different country groups and different time 
periods. This heterogeneity poses a serious challenge for meta-analysis. We address 
this challenge by nesting studies within coherent clusters and calculating fixed-effect 
and random-effect weighted means at different levels of nesting/clustering. At the 
most disaggregated level, each nest/cluster is determined by a unique combination of 
corruption and growth measures used in each original study. Then we define 
nests/clusters on the basis of growth measures and country types. In the third stage, 
we conduct precision-effect test (PETs) to establish whether or not the weighted 
means represent statistically-significant effects beyond bias. The PETs are conducted 
at the same level of nesting/clustering used to calculate weighted means.  Finally, we 
mapped the results of the meta-analysis with a narrative synthesis of the 
theoretical/analytical conclusions to establish the existence/absence of congruence 
between theory and evidence – and to provide an additional check on the relevance of 
the synthesized empirical estimates.  
The paper is organised in 4 sections. Following this introduction, section 2 presents 
the motivation for and methodology of the review. In section 3, we provide a brief 
review of the theoretical/analytical framework that informs original studies on the 
corruption-growth relationship and the meta-analysis in this paper. Section 4 is 
devoted to meta-analysis of the evidence reported in empirical studies – mainly 
regression estimates of corruption’s effect on different measures of growth. The meta-
analysis of this evidence, in turn, is carried out using fixed-effect estimates (FEEs) for 
study-level weighted means; random-effect estimates (REEs) for original estimates 
nested/clustered at increasing levels of aggregation; and precision-effect tests (PETs) 
for checking if the weighted means are statistically significant beyond bias. Finally, 
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section 4 provides a summary of the findings and derives some policy and research 
implications. 
 
2.  The corruption-growth relationship: motivation and systematic review 
methodology  
 
Like many concepts in social sciences, corruption refers to different practices 
involving different actors; and may have different consequences in different contexts. 
Despite this complexity, a principal-agent definition of corruption captures the nature 
of the problem fairly well. In this definition, corruption is a sub-optimal outcome that 
results from strategic interaction between an agent (usually a government official with 
a given level of authority and accountability) and a principal (usually a member of the 
public). The agent abuses public office to secure private gains from the principal, who 
is unable to hold the agent accountable due to high monitoring costs (see, 
Groenendijk, 1997).  
Estimates of the growth-impact of corruption analysed in this review are based on 
corruption data from four main sources: (i) the corruption index provided by the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG); (ii) The corruption perceptions index 
provided by Transparency International (TI); (iii) control of corruption scores 
provided by the World Governance Indicators (WGI) project of the World Bank; and 
other sources such as Dreher et al (2007), Economist Intelligence Unit and Sachs and 
Warner (1997) indices. The corruption data consists of scores between a minimum 
and a maximum value for each country/year. These are averages of the scores given 
by individual interviewees at each time period. If surveys are conducted monthly, the 
country/year average is the 12-month average of the monthly scores. Each study 
indicates the source(s) of its corruption data and provides information about the score 
range (which is 0 to 6 for ICRG data, -2.5 to +2.5 for WGI data, 0 to 12 for TI data, 
and similar ranges in other corruption data sources).  
This systematic review is motivated by increased national and international efforts 
aimed at reducing the incidence of corruption and improving governance quality in 
general. This drive has been at the centre of policy coordination and policy advice led 
by international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF 
and government departments involved in issues of international development such as 
UK’s Depertment for International Development (DFID).  
The United Nations adopted a legally-binding Convention against Corruption in May 
2004. The Convention obligates the 120 signatories to make corruption a criminal 
offence, develop institutions that will prevent it, and support policy coordination 
aimed at reducing the incidence of corruption. According to UNDP, this is justified 
because corruption not only impedes development, but also undermines democracy by 
corroding democratic institutions and the rule of law. In addition, the Convention 
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acquires a special urgency because the negative effects of corruption mainly fall on 
already disadvantaged groups such as the poor, women and minorities.  
This approach is also observable within the World Bank. Faced with mounting 
evidence of corruption in developing countries in the 1990s, the World Bank began to 
place emphasis on the need to reduce corruption as a necessary step to reach the long-
term goals of sustainable growth and poverty alleviation. As a result, the World Bank 
has been instrumental in the development of tools and frameworks aiming to reduce 
corruption and ensure transparency and accountability in aid and development 
policies.  This approach is shared by national organisations such as DFID, who seeks 
to develop better measures of corruption and of the effectiveness and limitations of 
the ‘legal instruments, institutions, and policies’ required to tackle it. 
The brief summary above indicates that a large number of actors are involved in the 
international effort to combat corruption. It also demonstrates that there is an evident 
consensus on the need to develop a better and firmer understanding of the causes and 
consequences of corruption. This systematic review aims to address this need by 
providing a meta-analysis and synthesis of corruption’s estimated effect on economic 
growth in low-income countries (LICs) and a larger set of countries including LICs 
and non-LICs. This systematic review also maps the meta-analysis of empirical 
estimates with theoretical/analytical findings on the types of corruption and the 
context-specificity of its effects on growth.  
The review methodology – i.e., the methods for searching, study selection, critical 
evaluation, and data extraction – is informed by the Campbell and Cochrane 
Collaboration guidelines on systematic reviews in healthcare and social policy. 
Particularly, we have drawn extensively on guidelines recommended by the Centre for 
Reviews and Dissemination (CRD, 2009) of the University of York. We have also 
benefitted from guidelines provided by the Evidence for Policy and Practice 
Information and Co-ordinating Centre (EPPI-Centre) of the Institute of Education.  
 
We have searched in 20 electronic databases for journal articles, working papers, 
reports and PhD theses; using 32 keywords for corruption, growth and low-income 
countries, and 43 low-income-country names. In addition, we have conducted manual 
search and identified 14 studies that had not been picked up by the electronic 
searches. We uploaded all search results of EPPI-Reviewer as our data storage and 
management platform. The decision tree summarising the decisions at different stages 
of the review is given in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1: Decision tree for inclusion/exclusion of studies 
 
 
The initial screening was carried out on the basis of PIOS (Population – Independent 
variable – Outcome – Study design) criteria. The choice of these criteria is informed 
by the PICOS framework recommended by CRD (2009).  The PIOS criteria enabled 
us to interrogate each study with the following questions:  
 
1. Does the study include ‘low-income countries’ or its synonyms in the abstract 
or title? (Population criterion) 
2. Does the study include ‘corruption’ or its synonyms in the abstract or title? 
(Independent Variable criterion)  
3. Does the study abstract indicate that it analyses/estimates the corruption-
growth relationship? (Independent Variable criterion) 
Studies identified 
through electronic 
searches 
 
 
Studies identified by 
hand-search and 
through consultation 
 
1,042 citations identified 
 
Title and abstract 
screening (using PIOS 
criteria) 
 
Studies that failed to 
satisfy one of the PIOS 
(Population -   
Independent variable - 
Outcome - Study design) 
criteria. Excluded: 664  
 
14 338 citations 
 
352 citations 
 
 
Full text of 352 studies 
uploaded to EPPI-Reviewer 
 
Full-text critical 
evaluation 
 
Studies excluded for 
failing to satisfy one of 
the validity, applicability 
and reliability criteria 
 
237 
 
115 studies included 
 
Review 
of XX studies (in XX 
reports) 
 
40 duplicates excluded 
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4. Does the study include ‘growth’ or its synonyms in the abstract or title? 
(Outcome criterion) 
5. Does the study abstract indicate that it analyses/estimates the corruption-
growth relationship? (Outcome criterion) 
6. Is the study theoretical/analytical (TA)? (Study Type criterion) 
7. Is the study empirical (EM) or mixed (EM2)? (Study Type criterion) 
We created codes for each of these questions in EPPI-Reviewer and ticked the 
relevant code box when the study satisfied the criterion implied by the question. Our 
decision rule was to include a study for the next (critical evaluation) stage if it 
satisfied at least 4 out of 7 questions, provided that the first question is also satisfied. 
Using this decision rule and applying the PIOS criteria, we have chosen 338 studies 
for inclusion in the critical evaluation stage.  
We conducted critical evaluation of 352 studies (338 from electronic searches + 14 
from manual search) with respect to validity, reliability and applicability (VRA) 
criteria. Here, validity refers to methodological rigour that would minimise the risk of 
bias; reliability refers to the extent to which the findings of the study are re-
producible; and applicability refers to the extent to which the findings are 
generalizable / applicable to low-income countries. To establish compliance/non-
compliance with these criteria, each study was interrogated with the following 
questions: 
 
1. Does the sample consist of LICs or does it include some LICs? 
2. Does the corruption data come from a documented and recognised source? 
3. Does the study report findings on growth impacts of corruption?  
4. Does the study have a valid study design compatible with empirical growth 
literature? 
5. Does the study carry out robustness checks for endogeneity and model 
specification? 
6. Is the study theoretical analytical (TA) or empirical (EM) or Mixed (EM2).  
 
Our decision rule was as follows: include if a theoretical/analytical (TA) study 
satisfies the first 4 questions; include if an empirical (EM) or mixed (EM2) study 
satisfies the first 5 criteria; and exclude otherwise. As a result, we included 115 
studies; of which 84 were EM/EM2, 39 were TA and 8 were ‘overlaps’. We extracted 
data from 84 empirical studies, but data from 12 of these is not used in the meta-
analysis because it reports either simulation results without standard errors or 
estimations results related to potential determinants of growth (e.g., foreign direct 
investment) rather than growth. Hence, the meta-analysis in this review is based on 
596 estimates reported in 72 empirical studies.  
 
 
 
 
7 
 
One characteristic of included studies is that their frequency distribution over time is 
congruent with that of all studies captured our search. The distribution over time 
reflects an increasing frequency for included studies and all studies captured by the 
search. The second characteristics relates to distribution of studies with respect to 
publication type. Among theoretical/analytical studies, we had 2 books, 6 working 
papers and 31 journal articles. The distribution of empirical studies is similar, with 3 
books, 12 working papers and 69 journal articles.  
The third characteristic relates to the method of estimating the impact of corruption on 
growth in empirical studies. Here there are two categories: studies that use simulation 
methods (3) and those that use regression methods (86). We have extracted data from 
simulation studies, but we did not use that data for meta-analysis. This is because 
simulation results are reported without standard errors or significance levels; and as 
such they are not appropriate for meta-analysis.  
The empirical studies estimate the impact of corruption on growth using a wide range 
of model specifications and estimation methods. The estimation methods range from 
ordinary-least-squares (OLS) through 2-stage and 3-stage least-squares (2SLS and 
3SLS) to generalised method of movements (GMM). With respect to model 
specification, it is generally the case that studies first report OLS estimation results as 
upper-bound estimates followed by 2SLS or 3SLS estimates and eventually GMM 
estimates to check for endogeneity thorough instrumentation. Despite this variation, 
however, all empirical studies estimate a growth model that is compatible with growth 
regressions discussed and tested in the empirics of growth literature (Barro, 1991; 
Mankiw et al, 1992; Renelt, 1991; Sachs and Warner, 1997; and Gyimah-Bermping 
and Taylor, 1999).  
In this review, we included all estimates of corruption’s effect as reported in empirical 
studies, irrespective of the econometric method through which the estimates are 
obtained. However, each estimate is coded systematically to indicate whether the 
underlying estimation is instrumented and what kind of estimation method (2SLS, 
3SLS or GMM) is used in the original studies. We have also coded each reported 
estimate as either ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ effect. In addition, both direct and indirect 
effects are coded with respect to the outcome they relate to – which can be per-capita 
GDP growth, GDP growth, GDP levels or interaction terms between corruption and 
other income determinants that may act as transmission channels for the indirect 
effect of corruption on growth. 
 
The alternative would have been to choose an aggregate statistic that summarizes the 
study-specific estimates (e.g. the average or median of the reported estimates) or an 
estimate chosen randomly from the reported set on the basis of significance or sample 
size or degrees of freedom. However, reliance on single estimates has two major 
shortcomings. First, it prevents the use of all available information. Secondly, the 
selection criterion is highly likely to have a subjective dimension. Therefore, we 
included all reported estimates and used the appropriate weighting method (fixed-
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effect weighting for within-study estimates and random-effect weighting for cross-
study estimates) to account for heterogeneity.  
 
We adopted World Bank’s definition of low-income countries (LICs), which 
classifies a country as LIC if its per-capita GDP is $995 or less. At the time of 
conducting this review, the number of LICs that met this criterion was 43. We report 
meta-analysis evidence on the growth effect of corruption for LICs separately. 
However, we supplement this evidence with further evidence on ‘Mixed’ countries 
(samples that include LICs and non-LICs) and on ‘All’ countries (LICs + Mixed).  
 
3. Analysing growth effects of corruption: the theoretical/analytical framework  
As indicated above, the incidence of corruption and interest in its causes and 
consequences began to increase in early 1990s. These developments unfolded against 
the background of transition from central planning to market economy in central and 
eastern European countries; and liberalisation of trade and capital movements across 
developing countries. Another point to note here is that the interest of researchers and 
policy makers in corruption was part of a paradigm shift that represented a relaxation 
of some of the central assumptions of the neo-classical economic theory. The latter 
had taken the existence of market-supporting institutions for granted and as such it 
relied too heavily on prices as a signal that generates an optimal equilibrium through 
their effects on rational economic agents’ expectations and decisions. Yet, the quality 
of economic governance institutions (formal or informal rules, norms, and conflict-
resolution arrangements) also affects economic actors’ expectations and the incentive-
cost structures under which they make decisions. Therefore, poor institutional quality 
may well lead to sub-optimal equilibria even if the price signal is not distorted 
through government control or intervention (North, 1990; Rodrik, 1999; Rodrik et al, 
2004; Acemoglu, 2004). 
The importance of governance institutions had been recognised since Adam Smith 
(1976: 910), who postulated that ‘commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish in 
any state … in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of 
government.’ In another section of his Wealth of Nations, Smith related the cross-
country differences in investment rates (hence, the differences in growth rates) to 
differences in the quality of institutions such as rule of law and property rights. 
Despite largely marginalised interest in the role of governance institutions, the 
incorporation of the latter into mainstream economic analysis owes a lot to Douglas 
North’s seminal contributions in early 1990s. In his book and in a seminal article 
published in 1994, North demonstrated how institutions form the incentive structure 
of a society and how they can act as the underlying determinant of economic 
performance (North, 1990; 1994). 
Research into the impact of corruption on economic performance (including growth) 
has been part of this ‘institutional revival’ in economics. This is natural because 
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corruption is both a cause and symptom of poor institutional quality, which distorts 
the true costs and incentives associated with economic decisions.  
The analytical framework we rely upon to analyse the impact of corruption on growth 
is informed by the institutional literature in economics. In this framework, corruption 
is a principal-agent problem that is caused or exacerbated by institutional deficiencies 
in a society.  As such, corruption is a ‘state variable’ that reflects the characteristics of 
the environment in which members of the public (the principals) are less able to 
monitor and hold accountable the public officials (the agents). This state variable 
differs between countries and over time within each country. In this review, we 
postulate that inter-country differences in economic growth (the observed outcome) 
are causally related to differences in the state variable (i.e. level of corruption). The 
causal mechanisms and transmission channels in the corruption-growth relationship 
are depicted in Figure 2 below.  
One channel through which corruption may affect economic growth is private 
investment - domestic and foreign. The investment-induced effect of corruption on 
growth may occur as a result of: (i) increased cost of investment (hence lower 
investment); (ii) quicker investment permits (hence higher investment); (iii) increased 
indirect cost of production; and (iv) higher uncertainty about future returns on 
invested capital at the macro level. 
 
Corruption may also affect growth through public investment and expenditure.  The 
effect here may be due to adverse selection of public investment projects or bias in 
allocation of public funds towards large and capital-intensive projects. In the case of 
adverse selection, projects with higher political returns may be selected at the expense 
of projects with higher economic and social returns – with the consequence of 
inefficiencies and lower (or perhaps negative) growth effects. In the case of biased 
resource allocation, corruption may lead to unsustainably high levels of public 
investment financed at high costs of public borrowing – with the consequence of 
increased volatility and lower growth rates in the long run. 
 
A third channel through which corruption may affect economic growth is private 
investment in human capital, measured in terms of years of education or educational 
qualifications. This effect may materialize because, under corruption, meritocracy 
does not function effectively as an institution that matches skills/competencies with 
earnings. Hence, corruption may reduce growth through reduced incentives for 
investment in human capital.  
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Figure 2: Corruption-growth relationship: channels causal mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corruption also affects economic growth through its adverse effects on the quality of 
governance institutions in general. Corruption is a symptom of institutional 
deficiencies, but it may also exacerbate such deficiencies by rewarding deviations or 
defections from optimal norms and enforcement mechanisms. To the extent that this 
is the case, corruption affects the optimising decisions of economic actors through the 
distortions it causes in the cost and incentive structures they face. Corruption distorts 
the risks associated with investment decisions, the cost of transactions, the level of 
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trust, and the capacity of the polity to resolve distributional or growth conflicts. As 
such, it distorts the capacity of a country to achieve economic growth through creation 
of new market opportunities or deepening of the existing ones.    
The analytical framework outlined above informs this systematic review, but it also 
captures the causal mechanisms analysed in both empirical and theoretical/analytical 
studies analysed in this review. In the remaining paragraphs of this section, we will 
elaborate on two further issues in the analytical framework informing this review: the 
type of growth models estimated in the original studies; and the reliability and 
appropriateness of perception-based measures of corruption used in empirical 
research.  
Model specification in the original studies follows a well-established method for 
cross-country or panel-data estimation of growth – which was introduced by Barro 
(1991). In these models, per-capita income is a function of investment, human capital, 
initial level of per-capita income, and a number of other variables such as openness to 
trade, public finance (government tax-expenditure variables), etc. This model was 
refined by Mankiw et al (1992), who have extended it to account for endogenous 
growth. Formally, the model can be stated as follows: 
 
),,,,(/ 0 GOpYHLIFNY =        (1) 
 
Where Y/N = per-capita income; I = investment; HL = human capital; Y0 = initial level 
of income, Op = openness to trade; G = public finance variables. Taking logs and first 
difference of the log values, the model can be linearized for estimation as follows: 
 
titiptititi govoyhlkg titi εαααααα ++++++= 5403210   (2) 
 
Where g = growth rate of per-capita income; k = investment arte; hl = change in the 
level of human capital; y0 = initial level of income;  op = change in the level of 
openness; gov = change in public finance indicators; ε = the error term; and subscripts 
ti = time and country indices. This model has been estimated by a large number of 
studies in the area of growth, including Levine and Renelt (1991), Mankiw et al 
(1992), Sachs and Warner (1997); and Gyimah-Bermping and Taylor (1999). 
The empirical studies analysed in this review utilise a variant of this model, with an 
additional explanatory variable to capture the impact of corruption. As such, they can 
be considered as part of the growth/convergence literature that includes corruption as 
an additional explanatory variable. Given this lineage, the general form of the models 
used in the original studies can be stated as follows: 
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tiktiktititi uCVCorrg +++= βββ 10     (3) 
 
Where Corr is the corruption variable and CVk is the kx1 vector of control variables 
that include all or part of the variables in equation (1); ant u is the error term. The 
coefficients are defined as follows: β0 = constant term; β1 = the partial effect of 
corruption on growth; and βk = the kx1 vector of coefficients representing the partial 
effects of the control variables on growth. 
Models such as (3) have the advantage of controlling for the initial income level 
and/or for other economic variables. However, if the vector of control variables 
includes investment, public finance or human capital (i.e., variables that correspond to 
the transmission channels through which corruption may affect growth indirectly), the 
estimated coefficient of the corruption variable itself would be biased downward (See, 
Mauro, 1995). This is because corruption affects not only growth, but also investment, 
public finance/expenditure and investment in human capital which, in turn, affect 
growth.  Hence, the estimated coefficients of corruption may not reflect the full effect 
of corruption on growth. The ‘missing’ component of this coefficient may be captured 
by the coefficients of the control variables (investment, public finance/expenditure 
and human capital) that act as transmission channels.  
Another problem faced in estimating models such as (3) is that the explanatory 
variables (e.g., corruption) may itself be affected by the dependent variable (i.e., 
growth). This is the endogeneity problem referred to above. If endogeneity exists and 
is not addressed, reported estimates are likely to be biased upward due to reverse 
causality. 
The studies included in this review address both problems. They address the 
endogeneity problem by using instrumental variables that are closely correlated with 
corruption but are not likely to be influenced by the dependent variable (growth) 
itself. The most commonly used instrumental variable is ethnic fractionalisation. This 
variable measures the degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious fragmentation and 
tension within countries. As such, it is considered as an exogenous factor that affects 
institutional quality irrespective of the income level. It has been used by Alesina et al. 
(2003) to estimate the effects of fractionalization on institutional quality and 
economic growth. Among the studies reviewed here, ethnic fractionalization is used 
as an instrumental variable by Easterly et al (2006), Aidt et al (2005), and Aidt et al 
(2008) and a few others. 
Another method for addressing the endogeneity problem is to use past values of 
endogenous regressors and current values of strictly exogenous regressors as 
instruments. This method has been suggested by Arelleano and Bond (1991) and has 
been used extensively in the growth literature. It is known as the General Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimation, which exploits the linear moment restrictions of the 
model. It has been shown to be an efficient method of instrumentation when there is 
not sufficient instrumentation data for the endogenous variables. Most studies 
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reviewed here use the GMM method to isolate the endogeneity problem (e.g., 
Gyimah-Brempong 2002; Aixala and Fabro 2008; Attila el 2009; Imai et al 2010; 
Aidt et al 2005; Lutz and Ndikumana 2008, etc.). 
 
The third method is to carry out simultaneous estimation of more than one equation, 
where the number of equations depends on the number of endogenous variables. This 
method enables 2-stage or 3-stage least-squares (2SLS or 3 SLS) estimations where 
reverse causality between endogenous variables is controlled for. Again several 
studies reviewed here use 2SLS or 3SLS methods of estimation to control for 
endogeneity (e.g., Li et al 2000; Mauro 1995; Ahlin and Pang 2008; Blackburn et al 
2008; Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004; Attila 2008; Haque and Kneller 2008, etc.) 
 
The second problem we faced while estimating models such as (3) is the blurring of 
the corruption’s direct effect on growth when corruption affects other determinants of 
growth such as investment, public finance or human capital. One way to address this 
problem is to obtain alternative estimates and check their robustness by changing the 
model specification. This involves adding or removing regressors in the model, to 
establish if the estimated effect of corruption (i.e., β1 in equation 3 above) remains 
robust to addition or inclusion of other variables that are hypothesized to affect 
growth. However, this is only a partial remedy because at least one of the growth 
determinants likely to be affected by corruption remains in the regression.  This is the 
case with all studies analysed in this review. Therefore, their reported estimates of 
corruption’s direct effect on growth (i.e., β1) should be considered as a lower bound. 
 
The other method for addressing this problem is to introduce interaction terms - i.e., 
multiplicative terms - between corruption and other variables that transmits the 
indirect effects of corruption on growth, but retains it within its own coefficient. 
Stated differently, it is technically possible to capture the indirect effects of corruption 
on growth by regressing the latter on the standard variables plus interaction terms 
between corruption and transmission channels. However, the interaction terms are 
usually correlated with their components (which are retained in the regression) and 
this causes multi-collinearity problems in panel data estimations – which are the 
dominant approach in studies analysed here and within the wider literature on growth. 
Because multi-collinearity undermines the robustness of the estimated coefficients 
(including that of corruption), only few studies include interaction terms and report 
the estimates of indirect effects. Hence, we have only 8 studies out of 84 (and 97 out 
596 reported estimates) that estimate the indirect effects of corruption on growth.  
 
The final issue to be addressed here is the reliability and appropriateness of the 
perceptions-based data used to measure corruption. Because corruption is essentially 
an un-documented transaction, existing measures of corruption tend to consist of 
subjective scores. Perception-based corruption measures may suffer from what is 
described as ‘halo effect’ or reverse causality. On the one hand, respondents to 
surveys may be expressing satisfaction/dissatisfaction with economic performance 
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(say, growth) in a particular year rather than the true level of corruption per se. On the 
other, higher levels of growth may enable countries to invest more resources in 
institutional capacity building, hence achieving lower levels of corruption over time. 
To the extent that such halo effects or endogeneity problems exist, regressing growth 
on corruption as a possible predictor may yield biased results because the measure of 
corruption used (i.e. the independent variable) may not be exogenous to the level of 
growth (i.e. the dependant variable) in a particular country/year. Such endogeneity or 
reverse causality problems have been highlighted in the literature, of which Kurtz and 
Schrank (2007) is a recent example.   
 
However, such concerns and criticisms have also been addressed in various ways in 
the existing literature. For example, Acemoglu et al (2001) have introduced 
instrumental variables that are correlated with institutional quality but are not likely to 
be influenced by economic performance in a particular year - e.g. settler mortality 
rates in the early colonial period. Using settler mortality rates as an instrument for 
institutional quality, they have demonstrated institutional quality determines 
economic performance rather than the other way round. Knack and Keefer (1997), on 
the other hand, used a measure of ethnic cleavage and the number of law students as 
instrumental variables. They also reported that survey-based institutional indicators 
such as rule of law, pervasiveness of corruption, the risk of contract repudiation, etc. 
are correlated with these instruments, which are found to be significant predictors of a 
country’s ability to catch up. Finally, using Granger causality tests for panel data, 
Rodrik et al (2004) have also demonstrated that the endogeneity problem can be 
addressed and that institutions tend to be more powerful determinant of economic 
performance compared to policy variables such as openness to trade.  
 
Furthermore, Kaufmann et al (2007) demonstrate that economic performance (e.g. 
growth) is likely to impact on governance quality only in the long run. They report 
that the ‘halo effect’ pointed out by Kurtz and Schrank (2007) – i.e. the short-term 
effect of economic performance on corruption perceptions – does not hold when the 
long-run growth of countries are controlled for. Therefore, the short-run effect of 
growth on corruption perceptions reported by Kurtz and Schrank (2007) may be 
simply mimicking for the impact of long-run growth. 
Nevertheless, there is an additional challenge posed by the use of perception-based 
corruption measures in empirical research: the risk of ‘business bias’ that may 
originate from survey design, which may involve over-representation of business 
representatives and/or selective choice of survey questions. This risk of bias must be 
assessed carefully because major sponsors or users of institutional quality data 
(including corruption data) are either business organisations trying to assess the 
political risk associated with a particular country/market or international organisations 
such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, whose remit is to 
encourage reforms conducive to the establishment of effective market mechanisms.  
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However, the risk of business bias may be less serious than suspected. On this matter, 
Kaufmann et al (2007: 13) report that scores obtained from business surveys are 
highly correlated with governance quality scores obtained from household surveys 
conducted by NGOs. For example, in the case of the ‘government effectiveness’ 
indicator for 2005, the correlation between two major business surveys was 0.74. This 
correlation, however, is quite similar to the correlation between the results of these 
two business surveys and a survey of households in Africa - which was 0.70. 
Similarly, the correlation between the scores of various corruption data sources ranges 
from 60% - 75%. 
This evidence does alleviate the concern about provider or end-user bias. However, it 
also raises the issue of divergence (of about 25% - 40%) between measures of 
corruption used in the original studies. Under this condition, it may be inappropriate 
to synthesize the estimates reported by studies using different corruption data. This is 
because differences between original estimates will reflect measurement errors or 
discrepancies rather than true differences concerning the effects of corruption on 
growth.  
We addressed this measurement problem in three stages. In stage 1, we nested 
(clustered) the original studies on the basis of 8 types of corruption data and 6 
measures of growth – generating 48 potential nests/clusters. In stage 2, we pooled 
together the two versions of the corruption measure that original studies have 
constructed from the same data source. This exercise led to semi-aggregate 
nesting/clustering with 24 potential nests/clusters – based on 4 types of corruption 
data and 6 measures of growth. Finally, we pooled together all studies using all 4 
types of corruption data and nested them on the basis of country type (LICs, Mixed, 
and All countries) and growth measures – generating 18 (3x6) nests/clusters. We 
moved from one level of aggregation to the next only after verifying that the weighted 
means of the original estimates have consistent signs across different nests/clusters. 
Although consistency between the signs of the synthesized evidence is verified, there 
remain evident differences between the nests with respect to the magnitude of the 
estimates. The difference (variation) between magnitudes is controlled for (taken into 
account) at the next of level of aggregation thanks to the properties of the random-
effect estimate - which accords lower weights to original estimates associated with 
higher levels of within-study and between-study variations. In addition, we have also 
conducted precision-effect tests (PETs) for estimates at each level of 
aggregation/nesting to verify if the latter represents a genuine effect, given the 
underlying heterogeneity and the risk of publication-selection or small-study bias.  
 
4. Meta-analysis of the empirical evidence 
 
The meta-analysis method has allowed us to synthesize the empirical evidence 
reported in the original studies and to verify whether the synthesized evidence can be 
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considered as a reliable measure of corruption’s effect on economic growth. For meta-
analysis, we first calculated simple and weighted means of the estimates reported in 
each empirical study. We divided the studies into 6 groups, corresponding to the 
measure of growth they estimate. Then we calculated simple and weighted means for 
studies clustered/nested on the basis of a corruption data they use and the measure of 
growth they estimate. The nesting/clustering procedure reflects increasing level of 
aggregation until all studies are clustered around country type and measure of growth 
estimated. Finally, at each level of clustering, we carried out precision-effect tests 
(PRTs) to verify if the weighted means can be taken as evidence of genuine effect The 
nesting concept is informed by de Dominicis et al (2008) in economics and earlier 
work in medical research such as Beacon et al (2000) and Goldstein et al (2000). 
 
4.1 Calculating weighted means and conducting precision-effect tests 
 
For each study, we calculated the simple and weighted mean effect, together with 
confidence intervals and average precision levels. For within-study weighted means, 
we used the fixed effect estimator (FEE) proposed by Stanley (2008), Stanley and 
Doucouliagos (2007), and de Dominicis et al (2008). The FEE of reported effects is 
calculated as follows: 
 
∑
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Where Ω is the weighted mean of the reported effects; iθ  is the series of reported 
effects ranging from 1 to N; and iw  is the weight. The weight, in turn, is the inverse 
of precision-squared – i.e., 2/1 iSEwi = , where SEi
2 is the square of the standard error 
associated with each estimate.  Then, the FEE is distributed normally around the 
population mean, subject to random disturbance from within-study variation.  
 
In stage 2, we calculated simple and weighted means for estimates reported by a 
group of studies nested within a cluster characterised by a unique combination of 
corruption and growth measures or by a group of countries. For the cross-study 
weighted means within given nests, we used the random effect estimator (REE) 
proposed by Stanley (2008), Stanley and Doucouliagos (2007), and de Dominicis et al 
(2008). The REE of reported effects is calculated as follows: 
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Where Ψ is the weighted mean of the reported effects; iθ  is the series of reported 
effects ranging from 1 to N; and iw  is the weight. The weight, in turn, is the inverse 
of the sum of two variances: the square of the standard error (SEi2) associated with the 
reported effect (i.e., the measure of within-study heterogeneity) and the variance (σ2) 
for the set of reported studies (i.e., the measure of between-study heterogeneity). 
Stated formally, )/(1 22 σ+= iSEwi . The REE is distributed normally around the 
population mean, subject to random disturbance from two sources:  within-study 
variations (SEi2) and between-study variations (σ2).  
 
In stage 3, we carried out precision-effect tests (PETs) to ascertain whether the 
synthesized evidence represent genuine effect - drawing on the meta-regression 
method proposed by Egger et al (1997) and used widely in work by Stanley (2008), 
Stanley and Doucouliagos (2007), Abreu et al (2005), Dalhuisen et al (2003), and 
Doucouliagos and Laroche (2003). The method consists of a weighted-least square 
(WLS) estimation, where the t-values of the reported estimates are regressed on the 
precision of the estimate. This method is built on the original model proposed by 
Egger et al (1997) to test for publication bias:  
 
iii uSE ++= )(01 ββθ        (1) 
 
Here iθ = reported effect estimate; )( iSE = standard error of the reported estimate and 
01,ββ = the intercept and slope coefficients to be estimated.  
 
Egger et al (1997) demonstrated that there is evidence for publication bias if the 
coefficient 0β  is significantly different than zero. This was an important finding that 
provided a formal test for funnel asymmetry. In addition, the model implies that the 
reported effect ( iθ ) will vary randomly around the ‘true’ effect 1β  in the absence of 
bias – i.e., if 0β is not significantly different than zero.  
 
However, model (1) is not suitable for testing whether the reported effect is genuine 
because it is inherently heteroskedastic. In other words, the reported estimates do not 
have constant variance.  Therefore, it is recommended to convert model (1) into a 
weighted-least-squares (WLS) model by dividing across with the standard error - iSE . 
This yields:  
 
iSEt
SE iii
i εββθ ++== 01 )/1(      (2) 
 
Now we have the t-value ( it ) as the dependent and the precision ( iSE/1 ) as the 
independent variable, the slope and intercept coefficients have switched places, and a 
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new error term ( iε ) defined. Equation (9) can be estimated by ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and provides a basis to test for both funnel asymmetry (funnel-asymmetry test 
- FAT) and also for genuine effect beyond publication selection (precision-effect test - 
PET)’ (Stanley, 2008).  
 
Testing for funnel-asymmetry requires the following test specification: 
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On the other hand, testing for genuine effect requires: 
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If the null hypothesis in (3) is rejected, asymmetry exists and the sign of the estimate 
of 0β indicates the direction of the bias.  
 
Yet, this test is known to have low power – i.e., the test has low probability of 
rejecting the null hypothesis when the latter is actually false. This increases the 
probability of committing Type II error and as such implies higher risk of not 
detecting bias when the latter exists.  
 
Against this weakness, the model defined by equation (2) has the added advantage of 
identifying genuine empirical effect regardless of bias. In other words, it allows 
testing for 1β separately. If the test for 1β  rejects the null-hypothesis, it implies that 
there is genuine effect beyond publication bias or small study effect. (Stanley, 2008: 
108).  
 
We carried out precision-effect tests (PETs) at different levels of study 
nesting/aggregation – and not for individual studies. This is in order to avoid the risk 
of within-study dependence – i.e., the bias that may result from correlation between 
the standard errors of the estimates reported by each study. Systematic reviews in 
healthcare and education address this problem by using multi-level linear models to 
estimate the degree of within-study dependence (Goldstein, 1995; Rosenthal, 1991; 
Beacon et al. 1999; Goldstein et al, 2000; and Rutter and Gatsonis, 2001). This 
method involves nesting patients or students/pupils within treatment groups or 
schools. Some economics reviews that have used nested models include de Dominicis 
(2008); Bijmolt and Pieters (2001); and Bateman and Jones (2003). This method 
enables reviewers to establish the existence or absence of a statistically-significant 
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relationship between reported estimates and the estimation method, model 
specification or data source used in original studies.  
 
We have drawn on the nesting methodology to address the issue of within-study 
dependence in a different way. We have nested studies within nests characterised by 
similar corruption and growth measures or methods of estimation and conducted 
PETs on that basis. Therefore, instead of trying to establish the existence or absence 
of relationship between reported estimates and the estimation method, model 
specification or data source used in original studies, we have tried to establish whether 
the random effect estimates (REEs) calculated for each nest represent a genuine effect 
of corruption on growth.  
 
 
4.2 Meta-analysis results-1: simple means for individual studies and study clusters 
 
Table 1 below presents the results of the meta-analysis for each study that reports 
estimates for one of the six effects of corruption on growth: 3 direct and 3 indirect 
effects. The estimates of the direct effects consist of estimated coefficients for the 
corruption variable when the dependent variable is: (i) per-capita GDP growth rates; 
(ii) per-capita GDP levels; and (iii) GDP growth rates. The estimates of the indirect 
effects consist of estimated coefficients for the corruption variable when the latter is 
multiplied with other determinants of per-capita GDP growth – i.e., with variables 
representing the transmission channels in Figure 1 above.  The original studies 
estimate indirect effects of corruption on per-capita GDP growth through 3 channels: 
(i) investment; (ii) public finance; and (iii) human capital.  
 
Estimates from studies reporting corruption’s effects on investment, foreign direct 
investment, or GDP per worker were extracted but not used for meta-analysis. This is 
because these indicators are either incompatible with the growth measures commonly 
used in the growth literature (e.g., GDP levels); or they do not constitute a growth 
measure at all.  
 
The table divides the studies into 6 groups, where each group consists of studies 
reporting estimates of corruption’s effect on a particular measure of growth. The 
empirical studies report 596 estimates in total. The breakdown of the reported 
estimates with respect to growth measures (i.e., the growth indicator affected by 
corruption) indicate that 68% of reported estimates (408 out 596) concern the impact 
of corruption on per-capita GDP growth. This is followed by 75 estimates (12.5%) on 
the indirect effect on per-capita GDP through public finance; and 44 estimates (7.4%) 
on the direct effect on GDP growth. The predominance of the estimates related to per-
capita GDP growth is in line with the empirics of growth literature – where per-capita 
GDP growth is the preferred measure of growth and cross-country convergence.  
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Table 1: Meta-analysis of original study estimates – sorted by precision level 
Studies reporting 
effect on per-capita 
GDP growth 
No. of 
Estimates  
Corrupti
on Data 
Source 
Simple 
Mean 
Lower 
Conf. 
Limit 
Upper 
Conf. 
Limit 
Weighted 
Mean 
(FEE) 
Average 
precision 
Mocan (2007) 14 Other -0.0014 -0.0027 -0.0001 -0.0004 1078.9 
Aidt et al (2005) 32 TI -0.0017 -0.0025 -0.0009 -0.0012 745.2 
Lee (2006) 6 Other -0.0078 -0.0206 0.0051 -0.0012 562.5 
Mauro (1995) 6 Other -0.0052 -0.0103 -0.0001 -0.0026 522.9 
Ahlin and Pang 
(2008) 48 ICRG, TI -0.0469 -0.0694 -0.0243 -0.0091 251.5 
Law (2006) 1 ICRG -0.0200     -0.0200 123.0 
Naude (2004) 7 WGI 0.0487 -0.0851 0.1824 -0.0006 83.3 
Kalyuzhnova et al 
(2009) 1 TI -0.0300     -0.0300 81.0 
Shimpalee and Breuer 
(2006) 17 ICRG -0.0329 -0.0419 -0.0240 -0.0197 78.5 
Gupta et al (2002) 11 ICRG 0.2330 -0.2163 0.6823 0.0233 73.1 
Gyimah-Brempong et 
al (2006) 27 TI -0.1494 -0.2443 -0.0544 -0.0987 25.6 
Guetat (2006) 15 Other 0.0086 -0.1867 0.2040 0.0095 21.3 
Aixala and Fabro 
(2008) 3 WGI, TI -0.1650 -0.1675 -0.1625 -0.1650 18.1 
Haque and Kneller 
(2008) 8 ICRG -0.7525 -2.0711 0.5661 0.0485 14.1 
Gyimah-Brempong 
(2002) 5 TI -0.2333 -0.2806 -0.1860 -0.0987 12.9 
Gyimah-Brempong 
(2001) 5 TI -0.2333 -0.2806 -0.1860 -0.2357 12.9 
Blackburn et al (2008) 43 ICRG  0.0325 -0.1925 0.2575 0.0008 9.0 
Tanzi and Davoodi 
(2000) 1 ICRG -0.3600     -0.3600 8.3 
Pellegrini and 
Gerlagh (2004) 9 TI -0.2417 -0.4465 -0.0368 -0.2815 8.2 
Khamfula (2007) 7 Other -0.9694 -2.9509 1.0121 -0.3209 7.7 
Gupta et al (1998) 6 Other, ICRG -0.3500 -0.5906 -0.1094 -0.3473 7.5 
Aidt (2009) 22 TI -0.3940 -0.6186 -0.1694 -0.3794 5.5 
Drury et al (2006) 11 ICRG -0.2531 -0.5294 0.0232 -0.3459 5.1 
Li et al (2000) 21 ICRG -0.0514 -0.4396 0.3368 -0.0050 4.3 
Easterly et al (2006) 
1 WGI  -0.8290     -0.8290 4.0 
Rahman et al (2000) 
6 ICRG 0.5940 0.5202 0.6678 0.5888 3.5 
Aidt et al (2008) 34 WGI, TI -1.3623 -1.9004 -0.8241 -0.5225 2.9 
Rock and Bonnett 
(2004) 12 WGI -0.7630 -1.6680 0.1420 -0.0574 2.6 
Li et al. (2001) 13 Other -0.5425 -0.7532 -0.3318 -0.5910 2.2 
Butkiewicz and 
Yanikkaya (2006) 4 Other 0.4233 -2.7175 3.5642 -0.2207 1.6 
Meon and Sekkat 
(2005) 9 WGI, TI -2.8800 -4.2111 -1.5489 -1.9705 1.2 
Everhart et al (2009) 
3 ICRG -2.6000 -5.0142 -0.1858 -2.5961 0.4 
Sub-Total 408             
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Studies reporting 
effect on GDP levels 
No. of 
Estimates  
Corrupti
on Data 
Source 
Simple 
Mean 
Lower 
Conf. 
Limit 
Upper 
Conf. 
Limit 
Weighted 
Mean 
(FEE) 
Average 
precision 
Dzhumashev  (2009) 
10 WGI -0.050 -0.075 -0.024 -0.001 200.6 
Baliamoune (2008) 
3 ICRG -0.061 -0.331 0.209 0.001 137.3 
Lutz and Ndikumana 
(2008) 3   -0.061 -0.331 0.209 0.001 137.3 
Imai et al (2010) 
6 WGI -0.559 -0.853 -0.264 0.672 7.0 
Gyimah-Brempong 
(2002) 5 TI 0.123 -1.773 2.019 -0.259 5.6 
Sub-Total 
27             
Studies reporting 
effect on GDP 
growth 
No. of 
Estimates  
Corrupti
on Data 
Source 
Simple 
Mean 
Lower 
Conf. 
Limit 
Upper 
Conf. 
Limit 
Weighted 
Mean 
(FEE) 
Average 
precision 
Ehrlich and Lui 
(1999) 6 Other1 -0.056 -0.100 -0.012 0.035 1347.8 
Gupta et al (1998) 
5 ICRG,WGI, Other -0.008 -0.017 0.002 -0.002 617.2 
Gyimah-Brempong 
(2001) 8 TI -0.526 -0.611 -0.441 -0.549 11.2 
Gyimah-Brempong 
(2002) 4 TI -0.477 -0.582 -0.373 -0.486 10.5 
 
       
Mo (2001) 6 TI -0.279 -0.471 -0.087 -0.262 4.6 
Studies reporting 
effect on GDP 
growth (cont.) 
No. of 
Estimates  
Corrupti
on Data 
Source 
Simple 
Mean 
Lower 
Conf. 
Limit 
Upper 
Conf. 
Limit 
Weighted 
Mean 
(FEE) 
Average 
precision 
Anoruo and Braha 
(2005) 5 TI -1.169 -1.607 -0.730 -1.197 3.3 
Swaleheen (2007) 6 TI -2.585 -3.556 -1.614 -2.133 2.6 
Breslin and Samanta 
(2008) 2 ICRG, TI -0.074 -2.309 2.161 0.075 1.9 
Kandil (2009) 2 WGI -1.300 -8.415 5.815 -0.841 1.6 
Sub-Total 44             
Studies reporting 
effect on per-capita 
GDP growth 
through public 
finance channel 
No. of 
Estimat
es  
Corruptio
n Data 
Source 
Simple 
Mean 
Lower 
Conf. 
Limit 
Upper 
Conf. 
Limit 
Weighted 
Mean 
(FEE) 
Average 
precision 
Li et al (2000) 2 ICRG -0.002 -0.364 0.361 0.002 22.5 
Attila (2008) 9 ICRG -0.142 -0.200 -0.084 -0.091 18.7 
Blackburn et al (2008) 
64 ICRG -0.950 -1.103 -0.797 -0.007 10.4 
Sub-Total 75             
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Studies reporting 
effect on per-capita 
GDP growth 
through investment 
channel 
No. of 
Estimat
es  
Corruptio
n Data 
Source 
Simple 
Mean 
Lower 
Conf. 
Limit 
Upper 
Conf. 
Limit 
Weighted 
Mean 
(FEE) 
Average 
precision 
Dzhumashev  (2009) 
8 WGI -0.017 -0.027 -0.008 -0.007 358.772 
Guetat (2006) 10 Other 0.225 0.107 0.342 0.120 21.335 
Pellegrini and 
Gerlagh (2004) 2 TI -1.360 -4.918 2.198 -1.260 1.656 
Sub-Total 20             
Studies reporting 
effect on per-capita 
GDP growth 
through human 
capital channel 
No. of 
Estimat
es  
Corruptio
n Data 
Source 
Simple 
Mean 
Lower 
Conf. 
Limit 
Upper 
Conf. 
Limit 
Weighted 
Mean 
(FEE) 
Average 
precision 
Guetat (2006) 10 Other -0.027 -0.088 0.035 -0.014 38.058 
Pellegrini and 
Gerlagh (2004) 2 TI -0.300 -2.079 1.479 -0.255 5.714 
Sub-Total 12             
Total number of 
reported estimates 596             
 
The second observation that can be made is that the simple average of the estimates 
has a negative sign in 47 out of 55 studies (85%); and the sign remain stable when 
weighted means (FEES) are calculated. The preliminary conclusion is that about 85% 
of the studies report estimates that point out a negative growth-effect when the 
perceived corruption increases by one unit on the scale. We do not propose to rely on 
this finding to conclude that corruption has a genuine and negative effect on growth, 
but the sign congruence between simple and weighted means and the predominance of 
the estimates with negative sign point out in the direction of a negative effect – which 
nevertheless has to be verified through the precision-effect test procedure. 
However, not all of the negative estimates are statistically significant. When we 
examine the confidence intervals, we can see that the proportions of statistically-
significant average estimates (simple means and weighted means) is as follows: 23 
out 32 (72%) for corruption’s effect on per-capita GDP growth rates; 3 out 5 (60%) 
for the effect on per-capita GDP level; 6 out 9 (67%) for the effect on GDP growth 
rates; 2 out of 3 for the indirect effect through public finance; 1 out 3 (33%) for the 
indirect effect through investment; and 0 out of 2 (0%) for the indirect effect through 
human capital.  
 
The third observation that can be made relates to the level of average precision 
associated with the average estimate for each study. We calculated the average level 
of precision as follows:    
n
SE
AP i∑= )/1( ; where SEi is the standard error associated 
with each original estimate, and (n) is the number of estimates reported by each study. 
Examining the average precision, we can see that 16 out 32 average estimates (50%) 
for the impact of corruption on per-capita GDP has an average precision level 10 or 
 
 
23 
 
more. The proportions for other measures of growth are: 4 out 5 (80%) for per-capita 
GDP levels; 4 out of 9 (44%) for GDP growth rates; 3 out 3 (100%) for the indirect 
effect through the public investment channel; 2 out 3 (67%) for the indirect effect 
through investment channel; and 1 out 2 (50%) for the indirect effect through the 
human capital channel. Overall, 32 out of 52 average estimates (58%) are associated 
with a precision level that is greater than 10 - which is usually the desired level of 
precision in randomised control trials.   
 
However, we do not propose to use study-level summary measures to derive overall 
conclusions about the growth-effect of corruption. Usually, when original 
observational studies of the type reviewed here report multiple estimates, the latter are 
derived from different model specifications or different sample sizes (i.e, different 
number/groups of countries included/excluded). However, despite these variations in 
methods or sample size, the underlying gross sample is the same and therefore there is 
a high risk of within-study dependence. To the extent that this is the case, the standard 
errors associated with different estimates may not be distributed randomly. The other 
reason is that a small but statistically significant estimate from the growth regressions 
will be necessarily associated with a small standard error – and this will inflate the 
level of precision. A careful examination of Table 5 can reveal this association. 
Indeed, the highest levels of precision are associated with very small average 
estimates.  
 
There is one further reason as to why summary estimates in Table 1 should not be 
taken as indicators of genuine effect: observational studies such as those presented 
above are characterised by a high degree of heterogeneity with respect to 
measurement, data sources, estimation methods, and sample choices. Given this 
heterogeneity, it would be inappropriate to aggregate the findings from each study 
without accounting for heterogeneity. For this, we follow a nesting method that would 
enable us to verify the extent to which study findings still point out a negative effect 
from corruption to growth when we nest studies at different levels of aggregation and 
within different country groupings. 
 
4. 3 Meta-analysis results-2: Unweighted means for clusters of original estimates 
 
 The empirical studies reviewed here use 4 main sources/measures of corruption data. 
In addition, some studies have transformed the corruption measure such that the index 
refers to less corruption as its value increases. We have coded the transformed 
measures of corruption as ICRG1, WGI1, TI1 and Other1. For remaining studies, we 
have coded the corruption measure as ICRG2, WGI2, TI1, and Other2. In total, there 
are 8 measures of corruption with potential to be used in the original studies. 
We began with nesting the estimates of the original studies on the basis of 8 
corruption data sources and 6 growth measures used. At this level, the estimates can 
be nested within 48 potential nests, as can be seen in Table 2 below.  
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At this level of nesting, the signs of unweighted means are consistent with what is 
expected. Focusing on per-capita GDP growth (first row), we can see that the sign is 
positive for version 1 of the corruption indices (i.e., ICRG1, WGI1, TI1 and Other1) - 
with the exception of ICRG1, for which the mean of reported estimates is negative but 
very close to zero. On the other hand, the sign is negative for version 2 of the 
corruption indices (i.e., ICRG2, WGI2, TI2 and Other2). If we read down each 
column, we can also see that the sign is positive for version 1 corruption measures, 
and negative for version 2. Focusing on per-capita GDP growth rates, this pattern 
suggests that a one-unit fall in perceived corruption (i.e., a one-unit increase in 
version 1 corruption measures) is associated with an increase in measures of growth. 
In other words, corruption tends to have a harmful effect on growth performance. This 
pattern is consistent with that of studies using version 2 of the corruption data – where 
a one-unit increase in perceived corruption is associated with a decline in growth 
performance.   
 
 
Table 2: Unweighted means for study clusters:  
Nested within disaggregated corruption data source and effect type 
 
 ICRG1 ICRG2 WGI1 WGI2 TI1 TI2 Other1 Other2 Total 
Estima
tes 
Pcgdp_growth -0.0018 
(58) 
-0.0990 
(96) 
1.0774 
(40) 
-1.6586 
(14) 
0.3725 
(152) 
-0.7886 
(21) 
0.3668 
(8) 
-0.3542 
(45) 
434 
Gdp_growth N.E. -0.0078 
(5) 
1.3000 
(2) 
N.E. 0.9448 
(31) 
N.E. N.E. N.E. 38 
Pcgdp_level N.E. -0.0612 
(6) 
0.5585 
(6) 
-0.0654 
(5) 
0.1228 
(5) 
-0.0338 
(5) 
N.E. N.O 27 
Corr*pubfin 
on 
Pcgdp_growth 
N.E. -0.8279 
(75) 
N.E. N.O N.O N.O N.O N.E. 75 
Corr*Investme
nt on 
Pcgdp_growth 
N.E. N.O N.E. -0.243 
(4) 
N.E. -0.4603 
(6) 
N.E. N.E. 10 
Corr*HumCap 
on 
Pcgdp_growth 
N.E. N.E. N.E. N.E. -0.0267 
(10) 
-0.3000 
(2) 
NE N.E. 12 
Total estimates 58 182 48 23 198 34 8 45 596 
(Number of reported estimates in parenthesis) 
N.E. = No estimates reported in original studies 
 
To elucidate interpretation, let us consider the entry in the cell at the intersection of 
per-capita GDP growth rate and WG1 corruption data. The unweighted mean of 
reported estimates is 1.0774. This should be interpreted as follows: a one-unit 
decrease in perceived corruption is associated with an increase in per-capita GDP 
growth rate of 1.077 percentage points. If we take the cell that combines per-capita 
GDP growth and TI2 data, the simple mean estimates of corruption’s effect is -
0.7866. This should be interpreted as follows: a one-unit increase in perceived 
corruption as measured by the TI index is associated with a decrease of 0.7866 
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percentage-point in per-capita GDP growth rates. It must be indicated here that the 
estimates in original studies are usually derived from panel data. Therefore, the ‘one-
unit change’ in corruption is relative to other countries in the case of random-effect 
estimation and it is relative to the country’s own past levels in the case of fixed-effect 
estimation.  
 
The unweighted means for the corruption’s impact on per-capita GDP level (row3), 
however, should be interpreted slightly differently. Focusing on the reported estimate 
using ICRG2 data (-0.0612), we infer that a one-unit increase in the perceived level of 
corruption is associated with 0.06% percent fall in the level (not growth rate) of per-
capita GDP.   
 
 The practice in the growth literature is to focus on the growth rates of per-capita GDP 
or GDP rather than per-capita GDP levels. This is because GDP levels do not account 
for country size or for the distorting effects of natural resources such as oil, gas or 
minerals. In addition, per-capita GDP levels may provide some indication about the 
level of development relative to per-capita GDP in other countries, but they are of less 
interest for researchers interested in the extent to which the country is converging 
towards other countries in terms of development. Given these factors, studies on the 
growth-impact of corruption also tend to focus on per-capita GDP or GDP growth 
rates rather than levels. This practice is reflected in the number of estimates reported 
in the original studies analysed here. There are only 27 reported estimates for the 
impact of corruption on per-capita GDP level, but the number of estimates on growth 
rates is 478 – and this is only for direct effects. 
 
In the next step, we have merged versions 1 and 2 of each corruption data source in 
order to obtain a single scale for each corruption data source. This was done by 
generating a new set of reported estimates in which the sign of the original estimate is 
multiplied by -1 if the original study uses version 1 of the corruption data (i.e., 
ICRG1, WG1, TI1 or Other1). Otherwise, the sign of the reported estimates remain 
the same. This method is justified because the magnitude of the reported estimates 
would have been the same had he original studies used version 2 of the index – only 
the sign would have changed. In fact, most of the studies using version 1 of the index 
acknowledge this. (See, for example, Ahlin and Pang, 2008; Aidt, 2009; Egger and 
Winner, 2005; Gyimah-Brempong, 2002). 
 
Table 3 below presents unweighted means of the estimates when versions 1 and 2 of 
each corruption data source are merged.  
 
An examination of Table 3 indicates that the unweighted mean of the direct effect of 
corruption on per-capita GDP growth and GDP growth is consistently negative across 
corruption data sources. A second observation is that the same pattern holds when the 
reported estimates represent the indirect effects of corruption on per-capita GDP 
growth rates too. The only exception to this pattern is the unweighted mean of the 
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estimates from studies using ICRG data and estimating corruption’s direct impact on 
per-capita GDP level – which is not the recommended measure in the growth 
literature. Given this pattern, but recalling that the unweighted mean of reported 
estimates does not take account of within-study and between-study heterogeneity, we 
can only conjecture (not conclude) that an increase in the level of perceived 
corruption is likely to reduce growth directly and indirectly.  
 
 
Table 3: Unweighted means for study clusters:  
Nested within merged corruption data source and effect type  
 
 ICRG  WGI  TI Other Total N 
Pcgdp_growth -0.0612 
(154) 
-1.2280 
(54) 
-0.4230 
(173) 
-0.3561 
(53) 
434 
Gdp_growth -0.0078 
(5) 
-1.3000 
(2) 
-0.9448 
(31) 
N.E. 38 
Pcgdp_level 0.0202 
(6) 
-0.3344 
(11) 
0.0445 
(10) 
N.E. 27 
Corr*pubfin on 
Pcgdp_growth 
-0.8279 
(75) 
N.E. N.E. N.E. 75 
Corr*Investment on 
Pcgdp_growth 
N.E. -0.0243 
(4) 
-0.4603 
(6) 
N.E. 10 
Corr*HumCap on 
Pcgdp_growth 
N.E. N.E. 
 
-0.1633 
(12) 
NE 12 
Total N 240 71 222 53 596 
(Number of reported estimates in parenthesis) 
N.E. = No estimates reported in original studies 
 
When we compare the magnitudes of the average estimates, we observe that the 
magnitude is the largest when original studies use WGI data; followed by others using 
TI, Other and ICRG data. In other words, data heterogeneity is clearly associated with 
heterogeneity in the magnitude of the estimated effects of corruption on all measures 
of growth. Therefore, the simple means reported at this level of nesting/aggregation 
should be considered only as indicative yet non-robust measures of pooled estimates. 
Instead, more attention has to be given to weighted means; and to the bias and 
precision tests results to be reported later. While the random-effect estimates of 
weighted means take into account both within- and between-study heterogeneity, the 
precision effect tests will enable us to verify if the estimates pooled at different levels 
of nesting/aggregation reflect genuine effect beyond publication bias.  
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4.4.3 Meta-analysis results-3: Weighted means and precision-effect tests for clusters 
of original estimates  
 
In this section, we report the weighted means of the original estimates, nested within 4 
corruption data sources and 6 measures of growth (Table 4); and within 3 country 
types and 6 measures of growth (Table 5).  These weighted means have been 
calculated in accordance with the random-effect estimator discussed above. As can be 
seen from Table 4 below, the weighted mean is consistently negative for all measures 
of growth and all corruption data sources. The exception we noted with respect to 
simple means above (the positive simple mean for estimates nested within the ICRG 
data and per-capita GDP level) no longer holds. A comparison with Table 3 also 
reveals that the magnitudes of the weighted means are smaller than that of simple 
means. This result is important because it demonstrates that the weighted means are 
weighted downward by the effects of within- and between-study heterogeneity. As 
such, they are more reliable measures of synthesized effect if they pass the precision 
effect test (PET). 
 
Table 4: Weighted means for clusters:  
Nested within merged corruption data source and effect type 
 ICRG WGI TI Other Total N 
Pcgdp_growth -0.0233* 
(154) 
-0.8191 
(54) 
-0.2378* 
(173) 
-0.2242 
(53) 
434 
Gdp_growth -0.0060* 
(5) 
-1.0258 
(2) 
-0.8376* 
(31) 
N.E. 38 
Pcgdp_levela -0.0223 
(6) 
-0.2303 
(11) 
-0.1289 
(10) 
N.E. 27 
Corr*pubfin on 
pcgdp_growth 
-0.7259* 
(75) 
N.E. N.E. N.E. 75 
Corr*Investment on 
pcgdp_growthb 
N.E. -0.0213 
(4) 
-0.3023 
(6) 
N.E. 10 
Corr*HumCap on 
pcgdp_growthb 
N.E. N.E. -0.1124* 
 (12) 
N.E. 12 
Total N 240 71 222 53 596 
(Number of reported estimates in parenthesis) 
bold* = Precision-effect test indicates genuine effect 
N.E. = No estimates reported in original studies 
 
We have conducted precision effect tests on the original study estimates that populate 
each of the nests in Table 4. The bold entries* in Table 4 indicate that the null 
hypothesis of the precision-effect test (i.e., the hypothesis that there is no genuine 
effect) should be rejected at 10%, 5% or 1% level. (The results of WLS regressions 
for precision-effect and bias tests are not presented here, but can be provided on 
request.) Hence, at this level of nesting, it can be concluded that 6 out of 14 nests 
return weighted mean estimates that satisfy the precision effect test; and the remaining 
8 do not. 
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Four (4) genuine-effect estimates are related to corruption’s direct effects on per-
capita GDP and GDP growth rates; and these are observed within studies using ICRG 
and TI corruption data. Another 2 genuine-effect estimates are related to indirect 
effects of corruption on per-capita GDP growth through the public 
finance/expenditure and human capital channels. The weighted mean estimates that 
do not satisfy the precision-effect test relate impact of corruption on GDP growth and 
tend to be concentrated in studies using the WGI corruption data. In addition, the 
indirect effect through the investment channel remains statistically insignificant in 
two corruption data sources (WGI and TI).  
 
Taken together, Table 3 and Table 4 provide evidence that would support four 
conclusions. First, random-effect estimates (REEs) provide synthesized results that 
are not only consistent with simple means, but they are also more reliable as they take 
account of within- and between-study heterogeneity. Secondly, the weighted means 
for all nests in Table 4 have a negative sign, suggesting that an increase in perceived 
corruption is associated with a fall in the growth measures. Third, precision effect 
tests are effective in identifying random-effect estimates (weighted means) that can be 
taken as measures of genuine effect beyond bias at this level of nesting. Finally, it is 
possible to nest studies at more aggregate level and conduct precision-effect tests to 
verify if the weighted means calculated at that level represent genuine effects.  
  
Given these conclusions, and with a view to identify the country-specific effects of 
corruption on growth, we nested/clustered the estimates within 18 nests, 
corresponding to 3 country types (LIC, Mixed, and All) and 6 measures of growth (3 
direct and 3 indirect effects). The weighted means and the results of precision-effect 
tests are given in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5: Weighted means for clusters:  
Nested within growth measures and country type 
 LIC MIXED ALL 
Pcgdp_growth -0.0667* 
(34) 
-0.1365* 
(400) 
-0.1297* 
(434) 
Gdp_growth -0.6542* 
(20) 
-0.5746* 
(18) 
-0.6007* 
(38) 
Pcgdp_level -0.1910 
(13) 
-0.1157 
(14) 
-0.1466 
(27) 
Corr*pubfin on 
pcgdp_growth 
-0.2319* 
(12) 
-0.7382* 
(63) 
-0.7259* 
(75) 
Corr*Investment on 
pcgdp_growth 
0.1206 
(2) 
0.0362* 
(8) 
0.0481* 
(10) 
Corr*HumCap -0.2890* 
(2) 
-0.0183* 
(10) 
-0.1124* 
 (12) 
Total N 83 513 596 
N.E. = No estimates reported in original studies 
bold* = precision-effect test satisfied 
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Comparing LICs with Mixed and All countries, we can see that the direct effect of 
corruption of per-capita GDP growth rates in LICs is significantly smaller than Mixed 
and All countries. Summing both direct and indirect effects, the corruption’s negative 
effect is -0.59 in LICs and - 0.86 in Mixed countries. Corruption’s effect on GDP 
growth, however, is similar in LICs (-0.65) and non-LICs (-0.57). Given that the 
preferred measure of growth is per-capita GDP growth in the growth literature, the 
smaller adverse effects in LICs merit some explanation.  
 
The relatively smaller adverse effects in LICs are compatible with two types of 
theoretical/analytical evidence. On the one hand, it is compatible with 
theoretical/analytical studies that predict that corruption tends to be more harmful 
after a threshold of institutional quality and it is less harmful of has no effect in 
countries below the this threshold (Aidt et al, 2008; Mendez and Sepulveda (2006). 
On the other hand, it is also compatible with theoretical/analytical evidence that 
indicates that corruption, combined with weak institutional quality, has substantial 
adverse effects on growth; but its effect may not be captured empirically as growth is 
reduced by a host of institutional factors (Kimenyi, 2007; Heckman and Benjamin, 
2008; Dellapiane-Avellaneda, 2009).  
 
Another reason for the relatively smaller effect of corruption on per-capita GDP in 
LICs may be due to the existence of excessive regulation and barriers that limit the 
number of economic transactions in the first place. This is in line with ‘greasing the 
wheel’ hypothesis, which suggests that corruption can be less harmful or even 
beneficial in the early stages of development when economic freedom is limited and 
access to information is tightly controlled (Heckelman and  Benjamin, 2008). 
 
Although the overall effect of corruption on growth is less detrimental in LICs 
compared to non-LICs, the indirect effect through the human capital channel is 
significantly higher in the former. This finding ties in with the predictions of the 
theoretical/analytical literature that emphasize the distortionary effects of corruption 
on the allocation of talents and investment in human capital – by the individual and by 
the government (Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny, 1991; Batiz, 2001; Acemoglu, 1995; 
Ehrlich and Lui, 1999; Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2007). We do not wish to 
overemphasize the importance of this finding as it is based on 2 observations only, but 
the correlation between high levels of corruption and low levels of human capital in 
LICs merit special attention to corruption’s indirect effect through the human capital 
channel. 
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5. Conclusions and recommendations  
 
The direct effect of corruption on per-capita GDP growth in LICs is statistically 
significant and negative (-0.07), but low. The indirect effects through the public 
finance and human capital channels are much higher (-0.23 and -0.29, respectively). 
Hence, the total effect that satisfies the precision-effect test is -0.59. This should be 
interpreted as follows: a one-unit fall in the perceived corruption index of a low-
income country can be expected to lead to an increase of 0.59 percentage-points in the 
growth rate of its per-capita GDP. For the mixed-country group (i.e, for country 
groups that include both LICs and Non-LICs), the total (direct and indirect) effect on 
per-capita GDP growth is higher - at -0.86.  
 
There is also congruence between the empirical and theoretical/analytical findings 
with respect to indirect effects of corruption. In LICs, corruption has a negative and 
genuine indirect effect through the public finance/expenditure channel (-0.23 
percentage point). This effect is higher in mixed countries (-0.74 percentage-point).   
 
The indirect effect of corruption through the human capital channel is also negative in 
both LICs (-0.29) and mixed countries (-0.14). However, these results are based only 
on 2 estimates for LICs and 10 estimates for Mixed countries. These estimates are 
statistically-significant, but are based on a narrow evidence base 
 
The meta-analysis results we reported in this review should be considered as lower-
bound estimates because the majority of the original studies estimate only the direct 
effects of corruption on growth. Yet, investment is included in all (exogenous and 
endogenous) models of growth; human capital measures are included in endogenous 
models; and public finance/expenditure measures are included in some models. Given 
these model specifications, the estimates of corruption’s direct effect will be biased 
downwards, whilst the estimates of investment, human capital and/or public 
finance/expenditures will be biased upwards.  
 
The main conclusions concerning policy implications and future research can be 
summarised as follows. 
 
Subject to limitations associated with meta-analysis of observational study estimates, 
the evidence synthesized in this review indicates that corruption has negative and 
statistically-significant effects on growth – directly and indirectly; and in both LICs 
and non-LICs. Therefore, there is a prima facie case for policy interventions aimed at 
reducing the incidence of corruption in both low-income and mixed countries. 
However, the findings also indicate that the economic gains from targeting corruption 
in low-income countries are likely to remain small if interventions aimed at reducing 
corruption are not combined with a wider set of interventions aimed at improving the 
quality of governance institutions in general. The relatively lower adverse effect of 
corruption in LICs is highly likely to be due to the multiplicity of institutional 
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weaknesses other than those captured by measures of perceived corruption – as 
suggested by theoretical/analytical literature.  
 
The second policy conclusion is that anti-corruption policy initiatives should prioritise 
corruption that distorts incentives and allocation of resources/talents with respect to 
public investment/expenditures and investment in human capital – where we detect 
negative and significant indirect effects. Anti-corruption interventions aimed at these 
channels should promote meritocracy in public and private employment in order to 
provide better incentives for individual investment in human capital; 
transparency/accountability in public procurement; and performance-related 
incentives for public employees. Such interventions should also be combined with 
interventions aimed at increasing the quality of governance institutions such as 
democratic accountability, government effectiveness and bureaucratic quality.  
 
The third policy conclusion relates to the growth-effect of corruption through the 
investment channel. The meta-synthesis of the original estimates suggests that the 
indirect effect of corruption through the investment channel in LICs is positive (0.12). 
However, the precision effect test result indicates that this estimate cannot be taken as 
evidence of genuine effect. Despite this ambiguity, we suggest that corrupt activities 
should be targeted across the board because of the non-divisibility of institutional 
quality as a public good.  
 
The fourth conclusion concerns the dangers involved in the conventional wisdom that 
assumes that corruption would have more detrimental effects on growth in countries 
(usually, LICs) where its level is higher. Both the theoretical/analytical and empirical 
evidence we synthesize in this review indicates that this may not be the case. 
Corruption has a negative and statistically-significant effect on per-capita GDP 
growth in LICs and non-LICs, but its direct effect on non-LIC per-capita GDP is 
substantially higher. Therefore, corruption should be considered as an international 
problem with negative economic consequences rather than as a problem specific to 
LICs only. 
 
We derive two main conclusions about the implications of this review for future 
research. First, we are convinced that sophisticated methods have been developed and 
used to reduce the risk of endogeneity or that of the so-called ‘halo effect’ in the 
estimation of the corruption-growth relationship. However, there is evident need to 
supplement the perceptions-based measures of corruption with relatively ‘harder’ 
measures. One possible avenue in that direction is to construct ‘weighted’ corruption 
measures, which combine the survey-based data with data on judicial quality, 
bureaucratic quality and democratic accountability. Another possible avenue is to 
estimate the determinants of corruption and the impact of the latter on growth 
simultaneously with a view to inject new information into growth regressions 
including corruption as a potential determinant.  
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The second conclusion concerns the need for greater attention to the indirect effects of 
corruption on growth by including interaction terms in the regressions. Currently, 
only 16 of 83 reported estimates for LICs account for indirect effects. In the all-
country sample, the proportion is 97 out our 596. Further analysis of the indirect 
effects of corruption on growth may be deterred by two factors: the reluctance to 
deviate from standard growth models; and the risk of multicollinearity (i.e., 
correlation between the corruption variable and the interaction terms that include 
corruption).  
 
We are of the view that recognising the need for deviating from standard growth 
models may be conducive to theoretical innovation. The problem of multicollinearity, 
on the other hand, can be detected and addressed by drawing on work by Dekker et al 
(2007, 2003), who propose new methods for addressing multicollinearity problems. 
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